Gabriel Stolzenberg - Debunking the Conventional Wisdom about the Science WarsWelcome sign in sign up. Relativism has a long history in our intellectual culture, and takes several different forms, such as relativism about knowledge and truth, ethical values, aesthetic quality, and cultural norms, to mention a few. The basic idea he opposes is that claims to objective truth and knowledge, for example the claim that hydrogen atoms have one electron, are in fact only valid relative to a set of cultural attitudes, or to some other subjective way of perceiving the world. There is a traditional refutation of relativism, as follows: The claim that all truth is relative is itself either relative or not. If it is not relative, but absolute, then it refutes the view that all truth is relative. Either way relativism is refuted. Boghossian considers this traditional refutation and though he thinks it is serious, he does not regard it as decisive.
PHILOSOPHY - Epistemology: Introduction to Theory of Knowledge [HD]
Fear Of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism by Paul Boghossian
Carter, J. Erkenntnis , doi: This paper is about two topics: metaepistemological absolutism and the epistemic principles governing perceptual warrant. Our aim is to highlight—by taking the debate between dogmatists and conservativists about perceptual warrant as a case study—a surprising and hitherto unnoticed problem with metaepistemological absolutism, at least as it has been influentially defended by Paul Boghossian Fear of knowledge: against relativism and constructivism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, a as the principal metaepistemological contrast point to relativism. On this view, epistemic principles are knowable, objective, and they can serve as the basis of particular epistemic evaluations, but their validity is relative to the wider global environment in which they are applied. Skip to main content Accessibility information.
Debunking the Conventional Wisdom about the Science Wars, Especially the Sokal Affair and its Aftermath In essays posted at this site, I use close readings of the science wars literature to debunk the conventional wisdom about them, especially about the Sokal affair and its aftermath. In doing this, I try to adhere to standards of rigor comparable to those of my profession, mathematics. I look forward to all criticism that is made in the same spirit. The symposium begins with my review, "Kinder, gentler science wars," of The One Culture? This is followed by five replies to the review by participants in the conversation and, finally, my replies to the replies.
Michael F. Young 2. In this paper I document the trend in both educational policy and thought in England. Instead of seeing knowledge as a source of freedom as the great philosopher of the Enlightenment would have argued, there is a worrying tendency to trust experience and see knowledge as something to be "freed from". I will explore an alternative to this "fear of knowledge" with the idea that the curriculum of schools should represent all a student or pupil's entitlement to what I will refer to as "powerful knowledge". This requires a clarification of both concepts, "power" and "knowledge". To do this I shall make reference to the concept of "powerful knowledge" as a curriculum principle, the idea that all pupils are "entitled to access to powerful knowledge" and that it is important to distinguish between a national curriculum and a school curriculum and the concepts of curriculum and pedagogy.
Objective vs Subjective (Philosophical Distinction)
Fear of Knowledge starts out as an engaging, breezy critique of relativism and constructivism. Initial appearances prove deceptive; while Boghossian's discussion remains engaging, it quickly moves to a very high level of careful and rigorous argumentation, and stays at that level throughout. Focusing to a considerable extent on the work of Richard Rorty, Boghossian carefully articulates the target relativist and constructivist views and the arguments for and against them, on the way to equally careful statements of the views and the arguments for them that he favors. That critique is powerful and on the whole highly effective. But the focus on Rorty, and Boghossian's intention to write a short, uncluttered and accessible book -- both of which are sensible and well-motivated -- lead the discussion away from consideration of highly relevant literature. The relative neglect of that literature and the occasionally questionable treatment of it when addressed makes the book somewhat less helpful to specialists than it will be to those seeking an effective antidote to Rortian postmodernist relativism.
Citazioni per anno. Citazioni duplicate. I seguenti articoli sono uniti in Scholar. Le loro citazioni combinate sono conteggiate solo per il primo articolo. Citazioni unite. Questo conteggio "Citato da" include citazioni ai seguenti articoli in Scholar.
Minds and Machines. Fear of Knowledge critically challenges contemporary trends in academic thinking. He suggests that this is not just a sweeping assumption of the human or social sciences, but is becoming an ever-increasing perspective in the natural sciences as well. In this work, Boghossian asks the important question: Is this assumption correct? Paul Boghossian is a professor of philosophy at New York University.